A graphical view of Sri Lanka vs South Africa, 2nd Test Match, Colombo, played 11-15 August, 2004 by Jack Solock

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Scorecard:

Sri Lanka v South Africa

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A graphical view of Sri Lanka vs South Africa, 2nd Test Match, Colombo, played 11-15 August, 2004.

 

Sri Lanka claimed their first ever Test series victory over South Africa with an emphatic 313 run victory at Sinhalese Sports Club Ground. It was the 3rd worst loss by runs in the history of South African Test Cricket, after their losses to Australia by 530 runs in Melbourne in February 1911 (in a timeless match), and by an innings and 360 runs in Johannesburg in February 2002. As a result, South Africa dropped from 3rd place all the way to 6th in the ICC Test rankings, while Sri Lanka moved up from 7th place to 5th.

 

 

The game graph shows a match that actually lasted less than four days (the fourth day limited to 8 overs by rain). Sri Lanka totally dominated this match, not only by runs, but by time at the crease, batting more overs in their first innings than South Africa batted in both their innings. The platform for victory, and the giant rising plateau line were built on the back of a magnificent 232 by Kumar Sangakkara, anchored by a 192 run 3rd wicket partnership with Mahela Jayawardene, a record for the 3rd wicket against South Africa, eclipsing the 168 made by the same pair at Durban in December 2000. For Sangakarra, it was the third consecutive time he had converted a century into a double, after the Asian Test Championship against Pakistan in Lahore in March 2002 (230) and against a severely depleted Zimbabwe in Bulawayo last May (270). He spent 8 hours and 49 minutes at the crease and was part of seven of the ten partnerships in the innings, which accounted for 414 of the 470 runs scored in the Sri Lankan innings. He spent only 51 minutes less time at the crease than South Africa did in both their innings. In addition to the Sangakkara-Jayawardene partnership, the Sri Lanka innings contains what might be described as a "scorpion tail" (note the upward slope of the last two wickets). In particular, the 10th wicket partnership between Upul Chandana and Lasith Malinga must have been extremely demoralizing to South Africa, not only because of the 37 valuable runs added, but also because of the 70 minutes that it kept South Africa in the field at the end of the innings. Often, such a partnership can be extremely demoralizing to the fielding team.

 

After the out of form Herschelle Gibbs was once again dismissed cheaply, South Africa fought back until the very end of the second day, when the 2 quick dismissals by the innocuous left arm spin of Sanath Jayasuriya, which broke a 108 run second wicket stand between Martin van Jaarsveld and Captain Graeme Smith, and then disposed of night watchman Nicky Boje, reduced South Africa from 109/1 to 109/3. The next day, Jayasuriya disposed of both Smith and Jacques Kallis within 1 run of each other, triggering a collapse in which South Africa lost their last 5 wickets for 48 runs inside 20 overs. From this point, South Africa were always going to be on the back foot.

 

Sri Lanka's attempt to score quick runs and put South Africa out of the game was delayed by rain on the fourth day, and when the rain stopped, they declared on 211/4, leaving South Africa 8 overs to bat out.

 

These 8 overs were fateful, because Malinga and Chaminda Vass were able to remove Gibbs and van Jaarsveld, leaving South Africa in desperate straits at 21/2 and needing to bat out an entire day to save the match. Here Vaas took over, showing that a fast bowler could wreak as much havoc as a spinner on a 5th day pitch. He was able to take 5 of the last 8 wickets to fall, including that of Mark Boucher, which broke the last South African resistance, after a 101 run partnership with Boeta Dippenaar.

 

South Africa were unable to emulate what Sri Lanka had done a month before in Cairns against Australia, or what England had done against Sri Lanka last December in Galle, bat out a day to save a match under trying circumstances. It was not just Vaas who did the damage, although his dismissal of Kallis with a brute of a ball showed why he is one of the most dangerous new ball swing bowlers in the world. Injudicious shots by Smith and Jacques Rudolph also contributed to South Africa's demise, shots that showed that young players are always at risk of folding in tough situations, no matter how well they might have played in the past. How much South Africa missed Gary Kirsten in this situation can only be speculated upon.

 

And so, with Sri Lanka on the up, and South Africa in disarray, we look at the scorecard of this match, and see a five fer by Jaysuriya in the first innings, a 6 fer by Vaas in the second innings, and can say, with some confidence, that they were the pick of the Sri Lankan bowlers.

 

Is there a way to show this graphically?

 

Bowling consists of three variables, average, economy, and strike rate. This presents inherent difficulties in a graphic presentation because of the different scales involved, and because of the fact that sometimes bowlers don't take any wickets in a match, leaving them with no strike rate or average.

 

One way to deal with this in a graphic sense is to use a variable that would fit on the same scale on a graph to compare the bowling performance of each attack. The method is simply to take the bowler's economy and subtract his wickets from it. The result can be called "adjusted economy". In the examples below, both teams' attacks adjusted economies for the entire match are graphed. Adjusted economies can be less than 0. In fact the lower they are, and the steeper the negative slope, the more effective the bowling, according to this method.

 

 

 

For South Africa, Jacques Kallis (23 overs, 60 runs, 3 wickets) yields an economy of 2.6086 minus 3 wickets = adjusted economy -0.3913, which is graphed over a distance of the 23 overs he bowled. For Shaun Pollock, using the same method, the adjusted economy is -0.66 over 38 overs. These were the "pick" of the South African attack (if such a term can be used for a team that lost by 313 runs). Lines are drawn at 10% and 20% of total overs bowled in the entire innings to give the reader context of each bowler's performance compared to the entire innings.

 

For Sri Lanka, a much bolder picture emerges, one that clearly shows what a match winning performance looks like. Clearly, Vaas and Jayasuriya are the pick of the attack.

 

Another way to look at this is that bowlers with a positive sloping adjusted economy line are net run givers, and those with a negative line are net run takers. Attacks are not strictly comparable to each other according to this method because of the different amount of overs bowled by each side.

 

This method is, of course, rather crude, and doesn't take into account several other variables: whose wickets were taken; who broke the threatening partnerships; what was the state of the pitch; how many times did the one bowler's hard work set up his partner for a wicket, and so forth. However, the method is simple and can be easily calculated and graphed. It can be used for an innings, a match (as was done here) a series, or a career. Hopefully, readers will find this an interesting and entertaining method for distilling bowling lines into a picture of effectiveness.

 

(Article: Copyright © 2004 Jack Solock)